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  The  New  Economy  and  the  interests  of  more  advanced  EU  Member  states 
dominate current thinking on EU and national level economic and regional policy goals. 
European integration thus drives a political economy of regionalism that—far more than 
traditional divisions between labor and capital—defines the principal economic players in 
the New Europe. The New Economy drives a radical shift in EU policy from cohesion or 
redistribution toward innovation promotion, affecting both distributional struggles and 
policy  approaches at the EU, national and subnational levels. Shifting strategies pose 
significant challenges at the national and subnational levels with important implications 
for  future  EU  economic  and  regional  development  policy  goals.  The  increasing 
concentration of funding on less advanced economies is eroding the policy’s traditional 
support basis and, ironically, diminishing its original intent and purpose. 
Keywords:  European  integration,  regionalism,  New  Europe,  regional  development, 
economic interests, Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Though many argue that an ‘ever closer’ and ‘undivided’ Europe
2 lies at the heart 
of the European Union (EU), many authors ignore the more deeply rooted elements of 
interest divergence at the heart of policy-making in the New Europe. Interest divergence 
is evident on many levels of EU policy making, from the terms of the Eastern Accession, 
to competition policy, to environmental protection.
3 In particular however, the Lisbon 
Agenda and the Sapir Report
4 have launched a debate that may forever change the face of 
EU regional policy. As argued herein, greater economic integration in the European 
marketplace increasingly places the more and less advanced national governments and 
national and subnational regional entities at odds with each other.  
  Two questions motivate this article. The first is what factors best explain interest 
divergence over the EU’s regional development goals. I argue that current EU regional 
development and national-level economic policy reforms should be seen in the context of 
the  increasingly  regional  dimension  of  economic  development  as  expressed  in  New 
Economy models. New Economy models emphasize the importance of both national and 
sub-national regions in economic development, the growing role of the knowledge-based 
economy and the importance of external increasing returns in structuring economic and 
geographic (or territorial) behavior. These developments have had a profound influence 
both on economic policy-making and distributional struggles across and within states. 
Thus  considerable  debate  has  arisen  in  particular  over  both  the  possible  re-
nationalization of public spending, as well as political decentralization vs. state-centered 
control and the appropriate use and targets of EU-funding. 
  Second I ask what this means for the future of EU regional policy goals and in 
particular the interests of less developed economies in the European Union. Though the 
Sapir Report did not envision the elimination of regional policy—the report recommends 
regional funding be “concentrated” on the less developed states (European Commission, 
2003: 6)—the question raised is ultimately how to shift EU spending from redistributive 
to more productive and innovation-oriented policy goals. Though one can question the 
specifically redistributive content of previous EU regional policy,
5 the persistence with 
                                                 
2 The references here are of course to Dinan (2005) and Vachudova (2006). Similar grand design views are 
expressed by Kopstein and Reilly (2006). 
3 See Ellison (forthcoming, 2006a, and 2006b). 
4 For more on the Lisbon Agenda, see European Commission (2000). For the Sapir Report, see European 
Commission (2003). 
5 See Dunford (2005: 977), Hall (2005: 970). Indeed many have argued that the functional-redistributional 
content of the SCF’s is overwhelmed by distributional politics. Some see the SCF as side-payments in order 
to secure support for deeper integration (Carrubba, 1997; Lange, 1993; Marks, 1992). Moreover, the quite   2 
which  the  Directorate  General  for  Regional  Policy  (DGRegio)  has  insisted  upon  the 
compatibility of Lisbon and Regional Policy goals suggests the divide between divergent 
developmental  aims.
6  As  argued  herein,  the  goal  of  achieving  a  productive  and 
innovation-oriented economy is at odds with the goals of cohesion and redistribution. 
  For the less advanced regions of Europe—in particular sub-national regions in the 
NMS’s—equity  vs.  efficiency  tradeoffs  (Martin,  1999)  threaten  the  well-established 
tradition  of  promoting  economic  and  social  cohesion.  The more  the  EU  broadens  its 
membership base to a wide range of less developed economies,
7 the more competing and 
contradictory  claims  on  EU  resources  emerge.  The  consequence  of  EU  enlargement 
across countries of increasing economic disparity is the concentration of EU SCF’s on an 
increasingly select group of states. As fewer and fewer advanced core states benefit from 
the SCF’s, the more the policy’s support base is gradually eroded. As the EU continues to 
grow in size, the potential result is the withering away of its redistributional mechanisms.  
  This article has implications for a broad range of literature. For one, it suggests 
intergovernmental models of European integration provide a first best explanation of the 
EU political process. States and the interests of actors within (not across) states describe 
the  principal  groundwork  of  EU  decision-making.  Second,  it  suggests  European 
economic integration and its broad impact on the increasingly regional and subnational 
dimension of economic development promotes a broad scale redefinition of the principal 
economic  actors  and  may  encourage  us  to  redefine  how  we  think  about  “economic 
interests”. Rather than defining these in terms of the factors of production—i.e. labor and 
capital—New Economy models emphasize the territorial dimension of interests and their 
expression through national, subnational regional and even supranational actors. 
  This article proceeds as follows. The first section provides an overview of the 
factors explaining the general paradigm shift in EU economic and regional development 
policy. The second section briefly outlines the structure of interests resulting from the 
New Economic model. The third section analyzes the impact of this shift on the 2007-
2013 Framework Perspective. A brief discussion and conclusions follow. 
 
Paradigm Shift? Cohesion, Redistribution and Innovation Promotion 
Resource struggles (in particular over capital) and re-distributional struggles (in 
particular over fiscal expenditure) are destined to remain strongly intertwined with future 
debates and policy-making struggles in the New Europe. Though politically difficult to 
achieve,  textbook  analyses  of  international  trade  suggest  the  costs  of  economic 
adjustment  are  easily  overcome  by  redistributive  transfers  from  winners  to  losers 
                                                                                                                                                 
broad distribution of funds across multiple states suggests that politics rather than variation in the level of 
economic development or more functional market corrective strategies are the principal explanation. The 
conclusions of this article and Ellison (2006b) provide strong support for this perspective. 
6 This objective has occupied much of the current public relations work of DGRegio Commissioner Danuta 
Hübner (see e.g. the series of speeches posted on the DGRegio website in spring 2006). Moreover, 
DGRegio commissioned a substantial study on the topic completed by the Danish Technology Institute 
(Danish Technology Institute, 2005). 
7 Just how many enlargements remain on the horizon and what geographic contours will define the future 
borders of the EU remains to be seen. For the time-being, the EU has undertaken to negotiate with Turkey, 
Croatia and Macedonia. But many potential future members stand in the wings.   3 
(Rogowski, 1989). Though EU redistributional tools could have dampened the blow of 
economic adjustment in the 10 New Member States (NMS)—in particular in the early 
years of accession and enlargement—far more has been done to protect Western markets, 
and increase the burden on Central and East European economies (Ellison, 2006b). 
  Competition between states over scarce resources—in particular capital, labor and 
EU  redistributional  funding  (e.g.  the  SCF’s  and  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
(CAP))—motivates  the  attempt  to  retain  the  more  tangible  financial  advantage  states 
receive from EU membership and to reduce potential losses. The institutional structure of 
the European Union however may  reinforce the position of large, economically more 
advanced states over smaller, less advanced states, thus making it possible for the larger 
and more economically advanced states to reap more of the rewards while the smaller and 
economically  less  advanced  states  bear  a  greater  share  of  the  burden  of  economic 
adjustment.  The  coincidence  of  political  and  economic  power  may  lead  to  less  than 
favorable outcomes for smaller and—in particular—less advanced EU Members states 
and regions.
8 
  The intergovernmental literature has long implied—though seldom investigated in 
adequate detail—the likelihood that the gains from European integration are uneven.
9 
Given variation in the relative economic and political power of states, policy outcomes 
presumably reflect that dynamic. In the aggregate, while all states are expected to gain 
from European integration, some states may  gain more than others. Side-payments are 
typically conceived as the mechanism by which more powerful states have been able to 
buy-off or compensate losers from economic integration (Lange, 1993; Marks, 1992). 
However, uncertainty and the substitution of perceived for real gains greatly increases the 
potential range of variation in policy outcomes, suggesting that states may inaccurately 
predict the benefits of European integration and lose not only on individual features but 
also in the aggregate (Ellison, 2006b; Ellison and Hussain, 2003). 
  New Economy models designate the mix of endogenous growth and economic 
geography  models  popularized  in  particular  by  Romer  (1994),  Krugman  (1991)  and 
Lucas  (1990).  External  increasing  returns
10  derive  from  the  geographic  clustering  of 
firms.  Economic  geography  models  in  particular  highlight  the  territorial  nature  of 
localized factors  generating technological  progress.  Territorial  effects  arise  both  from 
local spillovers generated by the geographic concentration of economic activity, as well 
as  from  factors  limiting  the  potential  geographic  range  over  which  knowledge  or 
technological progress is spread (see  Leamer and Storper, 2001; Scott, 2000; Martin, 
1999;  Storper,  1992).  Theoretical  controversy  remains  over  what  specific  factors 
ultimately drive external increasing returns, ranging from the Marshallian effects realted 
                                                 
8 Since smaller states are often seen as winners in the EU context, this may surprise some observers. As 
more trade dependent states they gain from market integration with their fellow EU Member States and 
their weighted qualified majority voting power—relative at least to their population shares in the EU—in 
the Council of Ministers has traditionally been greater. Such arguments however ignore both the role of 
blocking minorities (more easily manipulated by the larger states) and the population rule introduced with 
the Nice Treaty—which again greatly strengthened the political weight of the larger states. 
9 See in particular Moravcsik (1999) and Moravcsik and Vachudova (2003). 
10 I adopt Krugman’s (1991) language and distinguish in particular between increasing returns resulting 
from firm-level economies of scale and external increasing returns generated by the geographic 
concentration of economic activity. The implications of the latter are the focus of this analysis.   4 
variation  in  the  size  of  the  available  labor  pool  (Krugman,  1991),  to  informal 
informational  exchanges  (Leamer  and  Storper,  2001;  Scott,  2000;  Storper,  1992;)  to 
variation in the level and share of human capital (Lucas, 1990; Romer, 1994). Empirical 
evidence suggests that regional variation in levels of economic development, in particular 
at the subnational level, is best explained by New Economy type models (Martin, 1999; 
see also Sala-I-Martin, 2002 and Quah, 1996). 
   For the purposes of this article, New Economy models cast new light both on the 
forces  driving  economic  growth  and  development  and  on  their  territorial  impact. 
Observations from this literature have repercussions both for theorizing about the shape 
and substance of EU, national and subnational-level regional policy tools and goals,
11 as 
well  as  the  institutional  framework  within  which  they  are  formulated.  A  principal 
contribution of the New Economy Models is to question the linkage between regional 
development  policy  and  the  nature  and  structure  of  the  factors  promoting  economic 
growth  and  development  (Martin,  1999).  Theories  of  economic  geography  and 
endogenous growth promote increasing attention to regional clustering and the promotion 
of regional, geographically-localized spillovers. In doing so, they have two potentially 
detrimental implications for conventional regional development policies. First, they focus 
attention on pre-existing geographic concentrations of economic activity—in particular 
regions that are more economically advanced. And second, by promoting innovation-
promotion oriented policies, they draw attention away from redistributive-type policies. 
  The  nature  and  structure  of  European,  macro-level  and  regional  development 
goals has undergone considerable revision in the past two decades. European economic 
policy goals have exhibited a gradual shift away from their previous sectoral structure 
and direct redistribution (e.g. subsidies to firms and the support of declining industries, 
income  support  and  the  like).  Emphasis  is  now  placed  on  more  horizontal  forms  of 
assistance with broad application, in particular on the role of physical and human capital 
(or infrastructure, R&D, training and education).
12 Reform of EU regional development 
goals follows in the footsteps of these economic policy reforms. Intentionally or not, the 
Sapir Report dealt a considerable blow to previous regional policy initiatives. Since that 
time, DGRegio appears pinned between the competing agendas of regional development 
and the onslaught of growth and competitiveness and Lisbon Agenda policy orientations. 
  Though  the  radical  shift  in  development  strategies  and  goals  is  perhaps  only 
moderately perceptible, what is being questioned is the long tradition of EU and national 
level  policy  orientations  focusing  resources  on  agriculture,  declining  industries  and 
lagging regions.
13 As many argue, if Europe is to become more competitive, it must shift 
more resources to more competitive economic activities. Following Streeck (1999), this 
is part of a more generalizable phenomenon occurring at the level of the state as well. 
Streeck emphasizes the current national government practice of promoting productive 
assets (physical and human capital, education, R&D, infrastructure, etc.) at the expense 
of  redistributional  spending  (transfer  payments,  unemployment  insurance  and  other 
                                                 
11 See in particular Bachtler and Wishlade (2005), Martin (2003), and Baldwin and Martin (2004). 
12 Early discussion of the shift toward horizontal measures can be found in “Industrial Policy in an Open 
and Competitive Environment: Guidelines for a Community Approach” (COM(90) 556) and “An Industrial 
Competitiveness Policy for the EU” (COM(94) 319 final). 
13 This point is clear from the Sapir report (European Commission, 2003: 79, 126).   5 
forms of income maintenance). Competitiveness concerns drive a broad re-orientation of 
economic management strategies. Moreover, this phenomenon is occurring at both the 
supranational EU, national and subnational level of policy-making. 
  The  specifically  regional  character  of  this  shifting  policy  orientation  is  less 
obvious.  Yet  New  Economy  models  prompt  a  comparatively  radical  rethinking  in 
particular of the compatibility of national and sub-national regional policy goals. These 
models have focused attention both on the importance of agglomeration economies and 
their clustering of economic activity, as well as on the importance of regions insofar as 
such clustering tends to exhibit a particularly regional character. One should not however 
confuse (as some of the literature appears to do) the focus on the regional clusters of 
economic activity with the previous focus on regional policy and regional development in 
the less advanced regions of Europe. The New Economy model is focused on promoting 
dynamic  regional  growth—in  particular  in  regions  exhibiting a  positive  propensity  to 
support such growth—while the other is more clearly focused on an attempt to reverse 
patterns  of  economic  decline.  The  outcome  is  likely  to  be  an  increasing  degree  of 
competition between growth promoting and cohesion inducing public policy goals or, as 
phrased at the outset of this article, between innovation-oriented and redistributive policy 
goals. Moreover, this competition exhibits a decidedly territorial character. 
  The  prospects  of  Europe’s  less  developed  regions  are  further  frustrated  by 
significant regional  variation  in long-term levels of  economic  development. Repeated 
failures to turn some regions around (e.g. the Italian Mezzogiorno and East Germany), 
propel many to ask why EU or national level resources should be allocated to policies 
that do not always  bear fruit.
14 A number of authors thus point to equity vs. efficiency 
trade-offs with respect to national and regional economic policy goals (Brakman et al, 
2005;  Lackenbauer,  2004;  Bachtler  et  al,  2003;  Martin,  1999).  In  their  view,  if 
agglomeration  is  crucial  to  the  nature  and  character  of  economic  development,  then 
transferring resources to less developed regions is likely to slow the rate of economic 
development  in  advanced  regions  and  accordingly  may—by  diverting  valuable 
resources—fail to achieve their desired effect in less advanced regions. 
  Revising policy approaches directed toward less developed regions or reducing 
government  intervention  in  regions  on  the  decline  are  likely  outcomes  of  such 
observations. In fact, promoting growth in the more developed regions is often seen as 
the key to promoting growth in the less advanced regions (see Brakman et al, 2005; Scott, 
2000). As Scott argues, “geo-economic space” is made up of a “central nucleus” and a 
“hinterland” of variable size (2000: 48). Implicit is the notion that the welfare of more 
remote regions—though excruciatingly unclear where such regions begin and end
15—is 
dependent upon and pulled along by the welfare of the core regions. In this regard, New 
Economy  models  disadvantage  redistributive  policy  and  favor  more  targeted  and 
potentially more supply-side oriented policies focused on the development of human and 
                                                 
14 For recent overviews of the literature on the relative success of regional policy, see Jouen (2005: Annex) 
and Funck and Pizzati (2003). 
15 One way of thinking about this problem is to ask how it fits the European case which Scott does not 
directly address. For example, should one think of central nuclei and a hinterland at the national, 
subnational or European level? The relevant unit of analysis here is of course terribly important in terms of 
its policy implications.   6 
physical capital (education, R&D and infrastructure), potentially diminishing the regional 
cohesion and redistributive content of development policies. 
  Efficiency motives provide strong incentives for both national governments and 
regions to exercise greater control over economic development strategies. For national 
governments,  both  EU-based  and  national-level  regional  development  strategies—in 
particular those focused on cohesion and redistribution—potentially drain resources away 
from more advanced states and regions. While all states are broadly similar in this regard, 
the level of economic development across states generates variation in policy interests. 
For more advanced states, such observations drive an interest in promoting Lisbon-type 
objectives over more traditional forms of regional development. Lisbon-type objectives, 
however, embody implicit challenges, both to the interests of less developed states and 
regions and to the future of regional policy more generally.  
  For less advanced states, regional development policies may  be  preferable over 
Lisbon-type goals where this implies a greater concentration of funding on less developed 
states.  In  the  domestic  arena  however,  the  specifically  regional  focus  of  regional 
development strategies may potentially draw resources away from emerging economic 
clusters  and  upset  the  fine  balance  between  regional  and  national  level  economic 
restructuring and development. If resources are ultimately diverted away from policies 
promoting  economic  development,  national  governments  will  eventually  favor 
agglomeration promoting policies over regionally  defined strategies. Thus less advanced 
states are faced with significant equity vs. efficiency tradeoffs and are torn between the 
objectives of cohesion/redistribution and innovation promotion. 
   Many  define the principal economic actors with reference either to the factors of 
production  (labor  and  capital),  or  to  conventional  trade  models  (abundant  and  scarce 
factors), or with reference to the fortunes of declining and rising economic sectors.
16 Still 
others construe the major European political-economic debates in terms of the decline of 
coordinated  market  economies,  in  particular  in  the  framework  of  globalization  and 
European integration (Hooghe, 1998; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991; Streeck, 1999). This 
article argues that the future politics of Europe is likely to be defined by the politics of 
European, national and subnational regionalism. The above described paradigm shift
17 
drives the re-orientation of economic policy from redistribution to innovation promotion. 
Regionalism—driven  by  globalization  more  generally  and  European  integration  in 
particular—favors a new set of actors defined along a center-periphery dimension. More 
traditional  actors—e.g.  labor—are  compromised  by  the  contradictions  between  the 
supranational character of European integration (or globalization) and by the state-centric 
structure of European industrial relations systems (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991).  
The rise of knowledge as a factor in production (Gilpin, 2001) reinvigorates the 
“market corrective” role of states, subnational regions and even supranational actors like 
the EU, pushing them into the role of economic actors. Remaining agnostic regarding 
                                                 
16 For a detailed discussion of the variety of economic actors arising from the assumptions of various 
economic models, see Alt et al. (1996). 
17 The term paradigm shift may in some senses be inappropriate for economic development processes that, 
to some extent, have always been the rule. The way in which some economists and governments think 
about these economic processes has however undergone a significant shift.   7 
arguments about the advantages of state interventionism,
18 there is less controversy over 
whether states are increasingly engaged in the role of investing in “productive assets”, 
adding  “value”  and  creating  the  framework  for  the  production  of  knowledge  or 
innovation promotion. While competitiveness is the new mantra, it is wielded by states as 
well as national and subnational regional economic actors (firms and even labor).  
Important caveats to the New Economy approach exist. For one, faster economic 
growth in Europe’s peripheries appears as a potential contradiction to New Economy 
models and provides some support for neoclassical approaches. Slow growth in Europe’s 
core has been one of the driving forces behind the interest in re-orienting European policy 
approaches toward the Lisbon agenda. While it is beyond the parameters of this article to 
respond adequately to this debate, even some of the more avid and astute proponents of 
New Economy approaches provide occasionally contradictory data with surprisingly little 
commentary.  Martin,  for  example,  builds  an  argument  around  the  New  Economy 
approach but then provides data to suggest that the peripheries grew more rapidly over 
the period 1995-1999 (2003: 22).
19 Moreover, in recent years, the less advanced NMS’s 
have tended to grow more rapidly than the more advanced OMS’s. Such findings are of 
course potentially inconsistent with New Economy models. 
  Although less advanced regions are occasionally assumed to benefit less from 
economic integration and EU membership—in particular in the New Economy,  core-
periphery framework—the evidence to support this claim is mixed. Hooghe and Keating, 
for example, voice a degree of skepticism about the core-periphery model (1994: 369). 
Such findings generate uncertainty in the calculation of the likely winners and losers 
from the process of economic integration and EU membership. Moreover, some countries 
and regions have met with more success than others, suggesting that other factors also 
play a role—e.g. the specific institutional features of individual countries and regions. 
Variation in the economic success of Irish, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek regions, for 
example, is difficult to explain only on the basis of EU-funding. 
A thorough reorientation of European economic and regional development policy 
is  however  less  likely  in  the  near  future.  Policy  reform  is  mediated  by  the  slowly 
changing  structure  of  EU  regional  development  constituencies  and  the  interests  and 
relative  power  of  national  governments.  The  longevity  of  EU  regional  development 
policies is presumably a function of the relative disparities in economic development 
across the EU member states (the greater the economic disparities, the more likely such 
policies will be short-lived), of the relative policy inertia affecting EU redistributional 
policies and of the degree to which various actors are favored by the EU institutional 
decision-making structure. This notwithstanding, significant changes in the distributional 
structure  of  EU  spending  parallel  the  EU’s  enlargement  toward  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe, significantly  impacting the fortunes of less developed states and regions. The 
following sections detail the politics of EU regional policy reform and the outcomes of 
the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 SCF Financial Perspectives. 
                                                 
18 Krugman (1987) in particular criticizes the ability of states to intervene effectively. 
19 Martin does argue that while there is economic convergence across states, there is economic divergence 
across Europe’s regions. However he essentially neglects the larger question of what explains convergence 
across the states of Europe.   8 
 
The Politics of Regional Policy Reform 
  Much of the debate over economic and regional policy in the EU is in part driven 
by a desire to find ways of promoting national, supranational and subnational economic 
development objectives in Europe when the lion’s share of EU funding is devoted to 
agricultural  (i.e.  sectoral)  and  regional  targets.  Though  this  article  cannot  adequately 
address the shape of interests at the subnational level (see Ellison, 2007), it does examine 
the emergence of strong challenges to EU regional policy and their impact on national 
and supranational level EU politics. In particular, this section argues that the interest and 
role  of  national  governments  is  central  to  understanding  the  evolving  shape  of  EU 
regional policy. 
  Slow economic growth in the advanced core of Europe has inspired considerable 
interest in a focus on government strategies that are more likely to reinvigorate existing 
patterns of economic growth and development. Moreover, previous projects intended to 
kick start European economic growth—in particular the Single Market program and the 
project of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—no longer occupy the center stage of 
the  EU’s  agenda.  Further,  the  constraints  of  EMU,  the  convergence  criteria  and  the 
Stability and Growth Pact—in particular in the absence of a more fully-developed EU 
fiscal tool—presumably lead the more advanced EU member states to seek alternative 
measures for funding regional development. 
  But  presumably  the  enlargement  has  most  strongly  propelled  debates  on  the 
relative  value  of  EU  regional  vs.  national  level  economic  and  regional  development 
policy. The progressive concentration of EU resources on a significant number of less 
developed  economies  has  disrupted  an  otherwise  finely  crafted  compromise  between 
more and less advanced EU Member states. The Eastern enlargement’s statistical effect 
has resulted in the loss of structural and cohesion fund eligibility in most of the former 
cohesion  and  other  old  EU  Member  states—one  of  the  principal  causes  of  renewed 
debate.
20  The  Lisbon  Agenda  in  particular  began  to  re-orient  the  EU’s  focus  toward 
national and supranational-level policy frameworks with potentially growth promoting or 
efficiency enhancing features and to re-direct it away from regional policies that have a 
more  redistributional  or  cohesion  producing  character—correcting  in  particular  for 
regional disparities. 
  The mix of these pressures creates strong incentives for states to pursue quite 
different strategies of regional development. Rather than transfer resources to the less 
advanced  NMS’s,  many  of  which  are  already  growing  at  a  good  clip,  political 
expedience—in particular with respect to the domestic political context—suggests it is 
wiser to find ways to fund rapid innovation and technological change in the domestic 
framework. In important ways, this is precisely what the more advanced states have done. 
Given the failure to shift a significant amount of EU spending over to the Lisbon Agenda 
(and thus presumably away from the SCF’s) the more advanced states in particular have 
                                                 
20 The “statistical effect” refers to the former beneficiaries of the structural and cohesion funds who are 
currently being pushed above the 75% and 90% eligibility barriers due to the inclusion of a significantly 
large number of less developed economies in the EU’s average GDP per capita.   9 
lobbied  to  reduce overall  EU  spending.
21  Moreover,  at  the  domestic  level,  individual 
states  have  begun  to  overhaul  their  regional  spending  priorities  and  to  revise  their 
thinking on the advantages of EU level spending.
22 
  For the more advanced states, the Lisbon goals represent a mechanism for re-
orienting EU-level spending priorities and thereby re-directing some of their focus to the 
more advanced states. An emphasis on Lisbon-type goals is likely to mean the NMS’s 
must share more of the EU’s resources with the more advanced states. While the Sapir 
Report did  not  explicitly  propose  more  resources  be  dedicated  to  the  more  advanced 
states,  early  versions  of  the  revised  2007-2013  Framework  Perspective  in  particular 
provided  for  a  significant  shift  in  spending  toward  the  strategies  of  growth  and 
competitiveness (Jouen, 2005: 11). 
  The less developed NMS’s, on the other hand, are likely to favor SCF funding 
over  support  for  the  Lisbon  strategy.  Elements  of  the  Lisbon  Agenda  may  help  the 
CEEC’s to firm up ties in particular between domestic and foreign firms and to further 
promote the development of innovation-oriented economies (Ellison, forthcoming). On 
the  one  hand,  they  would  like  to  develop  greater  potential  for  increasing  return’s 
industries. As intended by the Lisbon Agenda, the promotion of R&D and education are 
key means of achieving this goal. On the other hand, the NMS’s face diverse sets of 
interests.  Less  advanced  or  declining  regions  may  require  more  traditional  forms  of 
support. While the modernization of infrastructure and the improvement of skill levels 
may prove helpful in these regions, the promotion of R&D may prove less valuable.  
Moreover, targeted investment promotion strategies intended to boost overall levels of 
(foreign)  investment—now  significantly  constrained  by  EU  competition  and  regional 
policy (ibid)—may prove more fruitful.
23 As Ellison (forthcoming) finds, the regional 
development strategies pursued in the EU’s former “cohesion” countries (Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland) were predominantly vertical as opposed to horizontal in character. 
  The  Commission’s  2007-2013  Financial  Perspective  SCF  guidelines  originally 
distinguished between the usefulness of Lisbon-type strategies for the CEEC’s and the 
OMS’s.  While  these  guidelines  urged  states  to  earmark  60-75%  of  structural  fund 
spending  for  Lisbon-compatible  goals,  this  criterion  originally  did  not  apply  to  the 
NMS’s.
24 However, the final version of the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective required all 
states to pursue Lisbon-type goals.
25 As Jouen notes, the overlap between the use of SCF-
funding and the Lisbon Agenda is strongest in the more advanced regions, while lagging 
regions tend to employ more diverse strategies of economic development (2005: 7).  
                                                 
21 The single most important document in this regard is the Joint Letter signed by the UK, France, 
Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden that proposed the imposition of this 1% ceiling on EU 
expenditure (December 15
th, 2003). 
22 The UK’s vision of future EU regional policy is expressed in A Modern Regional Policy for the United 
Kingdom and recommends both concentrated EU regional policy spending on the least advanced states 
along with a re-nationalization of regional policy for the more advanced states (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2003: 25-8). For a critical approach to the UK case, see Fothergill (2005). 
23 Ironically, even some advanced states would prefer to have more leeway to pursue investment promotion 
strategies. See www.Euractiv.com: “German Government Says it Knows Best what is Good for Growth” 
(April 12
th, 2006). 
24 See COM (2004) 487 final. 
25 See www.Euractiv.com: “Structural Funds get Lisbon Makeover” (July, 20
th, 2006).   10 
 
The 2007-2013 Framework Perspective in Context 
  Concluded  every  seven  years,  the  EU’s  multi-annual  Framework  Perspectives 
govern the distribution of EU funds across the Member states. The following discusses 
the  conclusion  of  the  2007-2013  Framework  Perspective  in  the  context  of  previous 
Framework  Perspectives  and  the  economic  development  interests  of  the  NMS’s.  The 
following  analyzes  the  degree  to  which  distributional  struggles  related  to  innovation 
promotion  as  opposed  to  cohesion/redistribution  have  pervaded  the  formulation  and 
conclusion of the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective. The development interests of the 
more advanced states had a profound impact on the EU’s distribution of resources and 
had a significantly negative impact on the share of resources made distributed to the 
NMS’s. 
  The  EU’s  multi-annual  Framework  Perspectives  continue  to  be  governed  by 
unanimity.
26 Thus any of the NMS’s theoretically have the right to block decisions failing 
to meet with their expectations. However the same is also true for the more advanced 
states. While each Member state is in theory granted equal veto power, the relative voting 
power of individual Member states is not necessarily one-to-one. States with more to lose 
from failed agreements (as from threats of exclusion) are more likely to make greater 
concessions. Nor do the CEEC’s as a potential voting bloc constitute a force that could 
stop policy proposals in other areas of EU policy regulated by qualified majority voting 
(QMV).
27 While it is beyond the parameters of this essay to discuss the issue of voting 
weights and relative power in more detail, an analysis of the conclusion of the 2007-2013 
Financial  Perspective  provides  an  indication  of  the  relative  ability  of  the  CEEC’s  to 
pursue their interests in the New Europe. 
  The initial Commission proposal for SCF expenditure published in February 2004 
was reasonably generous and went some way toward meeting CEE demands for equal 
treatment. A far greater share of spending was to be concentrated on the less developed 
economies and the Commission had proposed a 31% increase in overall SCF spending 
over the entire period (see Table I below; also Bachtler and Wishlade, 2005: 6). By the 
conclusion of the December 2005 Summit under the UK presidency, this amount was 
almost cut in half. One of the principal reasons was insistence from the net contributor 
states on restricting the total level of EU expenditure to approximately 1% of EU GNI.
28 
Given the unwillingness, in particular of France, to allow further significant reductions in 
the CAP expenditure, a good share of the cuts came out of the Structural and Cohesion 
Fund category.
29 
                                                 
26 Recent attempts at EU institutional reform have not altered this fact. Though the Constitutional Treaty is 
now moribund, it should still be considered a reflection of the possible shape of future reform. 
27 While the CEEC’s constitute a “blocking minority” in an EU of 27 members, in an EU of 25 members, 
they were 13 votes shy of a blocking minority. Moreover, the now moribund Constitutional Treaty wo uld  
have ensured that even in an EU of 27, the CEEC’s would remain many votes shy of a blocking minority. 
28 See the Joint Letter (December 15
th, 2003), ftn. 21. 
29 Though not surprising given both the relative political power of France in the European Union and 
historical precedent, significant French concessions on CAP reform would have gone a long way to 
satisfying many of the demands from developing countries at the Doha Round of talks in the WTO. More 
thoroughgoing WTO and EU reforms have now been postponed until 2008 or later.   11 
 
[Table I about here: SCF Financial Perspective 2007-2013] 
 
  The  Commission’s  February  2004  proposal  foresaw  a  considerable  shift  in 
expenditure from the Structural and Cohesion fund categories to the Competitiveness, 
Growth  and  Employment  category  (Heading  1A).  As  this  category  corresponds  most 
closely  to  Lisbon  Agenda  spending  in  the  European  Union,  the  original  Financial 
Perspective  proposal  contained  significantly  larger  potential  transfers.  This  category 
would have more than doubled in size by the end of Financial Perspective 2007-2013, 
representing a dramatic shift in EU spending priorities. In the final version of the 2007-
2013 Financial Perspective, significant reductions ultimately came out of Heading 1A. 
However, this was paralleled by a significant drop in overall EU expenditure from 1.24% 
of EU GDP to approximately 1% of EU GDP. Thus what the large, more advanced net 
contributor  states  lost  in  EU  expenditure  was  recouped  through  reductions  in  EU 
budgetary contributions. Moreover, the December 2005 Summit contained some unusual 
adjustments  to  the  EU’s  Common  Budget,  resulting  in  substantial  reductions  of  the 
Austrian,  German,  Netherlands  and  Swedish  contributions.  Thus  these  top  four  net 
contributor states made substantial gains from this final agreement.
30  
  Compared  to  the  levels  over  the  period  2004-2006,  CEEC  country  level  SCF 
distributions exhibit a significant rise for the period 2007-2013. However, along with the 
overall downward push in total expenditure, there was a progressive upward creep in the 
number  and  size  of  individual  allocations  (special  provisions  and  transitional 
arrangements) made to a broad range of OMS’s. The previous 4% of GDP threshold was 
lowered still further (however slightly) and a number of countries successfully wrangled 
additional  envelopes  or  transitional  expenditures  not  present  in  prior  drafts  of  the 
agreement. 
  Despite  resistance  from  the  European  Parliament  (EP)  to  the  final  package 
decided in December 2005, the final terms of the Inter-Institutional Agreement signed 
between the Council of the European Union and the EP only added 4 billion Euros to the 
total package. Just over 50% of this additional amount (2.1 billion Euros) was added to 
the budget of Heading 1A.
31 In this regard, an institution typically known for favoring 
European integration came to the defense of the OMS’s.   
  More  telling  perhaps  is  the  juxtaposition  of  the  final  2007-2013  Financial 
Perspective with its historical antecedents—in particular Delors Packages I and II.
32 At 
that time, the old Cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) were able to 
achieve  significant  increases  in  EU  SCF  expenditure—in  particular  due  to  the 
simultaneous pursuit of important economic integration projects: the Single Market and 
                                                 
30 VAT contributions set at 0.30% for other countries were reduced to 0.225% for Austria, 0.15% for 
Germany, and 0.10% for the Netherlands and Sweden. Further both the Netherlands and Sweden were 
granted total reductions in their GNI contribution of 605 and 150 million Euros respectively. See the 
Presidency Conclusions on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 (Doc 15915/05, CADREFIN 268, Dec. 19. 
2005: 29). I am indebted to my colleague Miklos Somai for this observation. 
31 See: “Mixed Emotions over EU Budget Deal” (www.Euractiv.com: Apr. 7, 2006). 
32 I draw here liberally from Szemlér (2005).   12 
EMU.
33 A similar politically opportune context is lacking for the CEEC’s. Moreover, 
several  years  of  slow  economic  growth  in  Western  Europe  along  with  a  greater 
concentration of Regional Development funds on Central and East European countries 
diminished Western Europe’s appetite for greater SCF expenditure.  
  Thus, the CEEC’s have been left with little bargaining room. While the NMS’s 
now  enjoy  full  voting  rights  within  the  EU,  they  have  not  been  able  to  achieve 
noteworthy concessions. Moreover, under existing voting rules, this is not likely in the 
future unless parallel integration projects can be leveraged for greater concessions. While 
the project of constitutional reform looms on the horizon, it offers little opportunity to 
effectively  claim—as  did  the  creation  of  the  Single  Market  and  EMU—that  deeper 
integration involves high costs for the less developed economies. Thus, for the time being 
at least, no similar integration project of comparable magnitude is in sight. 
A thumbnail regression analysis of the SCF allocations across the 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013 Framework  Perspectives provides some methodological rigor to the above 
analysis.
34 In addition to the explanatory variables adopted in Ellison (2006b)
35—level of 
economic  development  (pcdgp),  population  (pop),  unemployment  (un)  and  share  of 
public support for European integration (pubsupp)—the following additional independent 
variables are tested: the number of Member states at the time the distribution is decided 
(numms) and a dummy variable for New and Old Member states to test for the role of 
region  (region).  The  dependent  variable  is  the  total  annual  amount  of  funding  an 
individual state is eligible to receive during the funding period.
36 The data is analyzed 
using the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) method of regression.
37 
The  results  of  this  analysis  provide  important  insights  into  EU  distributional 
politics.  For  one,  the  role  of  region  loses  significance  in  the  2007-2013  distribution 
compared to that of 2000-2006 (see Table II below). In the first period, region has a 
strongly  negative  and  highly  significant  effect  on  the  SCF  distribution—on  average 
OMS’s received 2.234 billion Euros more than NMS’s. As Ellison (2006b) argues, the 
CEEC’s  were  strongly  disadvantaged  in  the  first  years  of  EU  membership.  This 
disadvantage  has  moderated.  In  the  2007-2013  period  there  is  a  slight  advantage  for 
CEEC’s—on average NMS’s receive 394 million Euros more than OMS’s—though the 
coefficient is neither stable nor significant. While the Commission’s proposal was the 
least discriminatory across states—reflected by the very small negative coefficient on the 
                                                 
33 See in particular Lange (1993). 
34 More complete information on methodology, variable selection and data sources is provided in Annex I. 
35 The explanatory variables chosen in this model were those the EU argues matter with respect to the 
distribution of SCF’s (the level of economic development, unemployment and the size of the affected 
population). In addition, following Carrubba (1997), Ellison (2006b) tests for the potential impact of 
declining public support for European integration on raising EU financial support. 
36 For the NMS’s, the annual amount is only calculated for the years of membership (2004-2006), as 
opposed to 2000-2006 for the OMS’s. Since not all states are able to make full use of the available EU 
funds, the total amount of funding states are eligible to receive may differ from the amounts they are able to 
put to use. 
37 The same basic caveats that applied to the analysis in Ellison (2006b) apply here. Since the unit of 
analysis is the country, this analysis is inadequately sensitive to regional variation—in particular in the 
level of economic development, unemployment and public support for European integration. While 
cohesion funds are granted to states, structural funds are explicitly intended for regions.   13 
region  variable  and  no  consistency  in  this  finding  across  states—the  final  2007-2013 
Framework Perspective tended to favor the NMS’s. The rise in funding for the NMS’s 
however pales in comparison to the far higher amounts given to Western states during the 
2000—2006 Framework perspective. 
Per  capita  GDP,  public  support  and  unemployment  all  begin  to  approach 
significance  and have a strong impact on the NMS  distribution of funding under the 
2007-2013 Framework Perspective. In the previous period, only country size (population) 
appeared to have any significant impact on the distribution of funding. Oddly however, 
per capita GDP has the opposite effect from that predicted in the NMS’s (more advanced 
NMS’s received higher levels of funding). And public support has the opposite effect 
from that expected in the OMS’s (lower levels of support were negatively correlated with 
higher  spending).  The  decision  to  allocate  greater  amounts  of  funding  to  the  more 
advanced  NMS’s  may  relate  to  their  greater  potential  to  absorb  EU  SCF-funding. 
Population  remains  the  single  most  powerful  explanatory  variable  across  the  NMS’s 
under the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective. Along with the unusually high degree of fit 
for the NMS regression model (93% of the variance is explained), this suggests politics 
continues to play much less of a role in the distribution of SCF-funding in the NMS’s 
than in the OMS’s or across the New and Old Member states.  
The prediction that the number of Member states has a negative impact on total 
funding requires more attention. In the combined data, there is a positive though far from 
consistent  or  significant  relationship  between  the  number  of  member  states  and  the 
allocation of EU funding. Adding one additional Member State adds approximately 10.6 
million Euros to the total budget. However, much of the change here can be explained by 
the large and statistically significant increase in funding for the NMS’s between the two 
periods. Funding levels for the OMS’s have declined by almost the same amount relative 
to  the  number  of  Member  states.  This  finding  is  marginally  (but  only  marginally) 
commensurate with the intention of concentrating funding on the less developed states. 
As noted above, the increase in NMS funding pales in comparison to the dramatically 
preferential treatment of OMS’s under the 2000-2006 Framework Perspective. Moreover, 
the greatly moderated impact of per capita GDP—the coefficient in considerably smaller 
than in the previous period and is far from significant—under the 2007-2013 Framework 
Perspective suggests the OMS’s are again receiving surprisingly large shares of SCF-
funding. 
 
[Table II: Explaining Variation in SCF Funding] 
 
Figures  1A  and  1B  below  confirm  these  general  suspicions.  Using  the 
distributional logic derived by the regression equation for the combined set of Member 
states for the 2007-2013 Framework Perspective, Figure 1A provides data on both actual 
and  predicted  SCF  allocations.
38  Seven  OMS’s  (Austria,  Greece,  Italy,  Luxembourg, 
                                                 
38 These predicted values and those that follow should be treated with some caution. While the goodness of 
fit is reasonably high when actual values for the NMS’s alone are regressed on the range of independent 
variables included here, it is substantially lower when considering the actual values only for the OMS’s or 
for all states (see the respective “adjusted r
2” values in Table II).   14 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden) received substantially more than they would have received 
had  this  logic  been  applied  more  consistently  across  all  states.  For  the  NMS’s  the 
differences  between  the  predicted  and  actual  values  are  even more  substantial.  Apart 
from  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland,  the  NMS’s  would  have  received 
significantly larger sums. 
Figure 1B is even more compelling. This figure provides data on both predicted 
allocations  based  on  the  logic  defined  by  the  regression  equation  derived  from  the 
OMS’s. In this case only five OMS’s (Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and the UK) 
received more than they would have had the 2000-2006 OMS logic been consistently 
applied across all states. For the NMS’s, the differences between predicted and actual 
values  are  more  substantial  and—apart  from  the  same  three  countries—the  NMS’s 
generally would have received larger shares of SCF-funding. However, in this case, what 
is most striking is the overall magnitude of funding the NMS’s would have received. 
Based on the 2000-2006 OMS logic, total funding amounts (compare the values on the y-
axis  in  Figures  1A  and  1B)  would  have  been  approximately  twice  as  large  as  those 
allocated according to the logic for the 2007-2013 Financial Perspective. Comparing the 
2000-2006  OMS  logic  to  actual  (not  predicted)  figures  for  the  2007-2013  Financial 
Perspective, the NMS’s would have received approximately 4.4 times more funding and 
the OMS’s approximately 18.7 times less funding. 
 
Discussion 
At least four issues will presumably remain at the center of discussion in future 
reforms  of  EU  redistributional  politics.  For  one,  contradictions  between  the 
redistributive,  cohesion-producing  and  innovation  promoting  goals  of  EU  regional 
development  and  national-level  economic  policy  clearly  need  to  be  worked  out.  In 
particular, a better understanding of which policy tools work best at different levels of 
national and subnational regional economic development would be particularly helpful. 
Both policy approaches have positive features that should presumably be retained and 
improved.  
For another, future policy efforts need to resolve or improve upon the problem of 
variation in and balance between the interests of more  and less developed states. As 
suggested herein, due to the increasing degree of concentration of SCF funds, neglecting 
this problem may ultimately lead to the future withering away of EU SCF policy. Support 
for  these  policies—in  particular  in  the  context  of  slow  growth  in  the  European  core 
economies—is likely to be eroded by domestic and national level interests in economic 
development in the more advanced states. However, accommodations should presumably 
not be made at the expense of the NMS’s. 
Third, the big question at the national and EU-level remains how best to distribute 
available funds to the sundry interested groups and parties and what political, economic 
and social logic and institutional structure should govern that distribution. As suggested 
herein, current strategies of economic development are likely to create strong incentives 
to further centralize the control of EU SCF funding in the hands of central or state level 
governments  (see  also  Ellison,  2007).  This  is  likely  to  give  rise  to  significant 
domestic/national-level struggles over the use and implementation of EU funding. Since   15 
these funding amounts are significant, one can expect domestic national-level political 
battles to become more polarized.  
Finally, the ultimate challenge in the future EU may well be the equitable and/or 
efficient distribution of resources between the more and less developed regions and states 
of  Europe.  The  real  challenge  in  the  future  Europe may  be  how  best  to  manage  the 
competing interests of regions, states and subnational regions. As this analysis suggests, 
the  more  advanced  regions  of  Europe  have  very  different  interests  in  European 
governance than the less developed regions of  Europe.  Increasing economic disparity 
across these regions only reinforces the likely rivalry of these competing interests. The 
re-nationalization  of  economic  and  regional  development  policy—in  particular  in  the 
more  advanced  states—provides  one  alternative  policy  proposal  for  the New  Europe. 
However, the more advanced and savvy regions and states may  ultimately decide not to 
forego the potential coordination of economic management that European integration and 
EU-level decision-making capacity enables. 
 
Conclusion 
  Despite the inherently universalizing logic of globalization, economic space has 
simultaneously  become  smaller, more  local and  taken on  a  distinctively  sub-national, 
regional character. As intimated more than two decades ago in a trend-setting book The 
Second Industrial Divide,
39 regional structures of economic development are gradually 
becoming  more  pronounced,  a  phenomenon  only  likely  to  intensify  as  European 
economic and political integration progresses. More and more, EU policy is beginning to 
reflect this shift in economic structure. The gradual paradigm shift outlined above has led 
states  to  lobby  for  reform,  reduce  EU  expenditure,  limit the  potential range  of NMS 
benefits and possibly even to consider withdrawal from the Union.
40 While the declining 
cohesion  of  coordinated  market  economies  may  explain  some  of  this  shift  from 
redistribution to innovation promotion, a more significant share is easily encompassed by 
the  emergence  of  economic  regionalism  and  change  in  the  strategic  thinking  about 
economic and regional policy goals. 
  Overcoming the costs of economic adjustment via redistributive transfers from 
winners to losers is rendered problematic both by thinking on the appropriate strategies to 
pursue in order to achieve greater levels of economic development, as well as by the 
institutional and political structure in which such policies are created. The large and more 
advanced states—most of them net contributors to the EU budget—have lobbied hard 
both  to  increase  the  weight  of  Lisbon  Agenda  type  spending  and  to  reduce  overall 
expenditures on the SCF. 
  This  notwithstanding,  the  transition  from  the  2000-2006  to  the  2007-2013 
Framework  Perspectives  will  benefit  the  NMS’s.  At  least  for  the  next  seven  years, 
Central and East European states will enjoy significantly higher expenditures than during 
the  first  3  years  of  EU  membership (2004-2006).  Due  to  the  concentration EU  SCF 
spending on the least advanced Member states, the NMS’s will be the principal recipients 
                                                 
39 Piore and Sabel (1984). 
40 This may be one way to interpret the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty.   16 
for the upcoming framework period. Per person, these states will on average receive 237 
Euros per year compared to 64 Euros per year for the OMS’s. What will happen with 
future framework periods is more complicated and depends both on how the European 
economy  performs  in  the  coming  years  and  on  how  many  states  are  able  to  gain 
membership status by 2014. 
Whether the allocations will be enough to compensate the NMS for the costs of 
economic adjustment, provide an adequate foundation for continued economic structuring 
and  assist  them  in  fulfilling  the  requirements  of  compliance  with  the  EU  regulatory 
framework  is  more  problematic.  The  financial  and  regulatory  demands  of  EU 
membership are significant. Several of the NMS’s (and some of the OMS’s) have already 
been the target of the EU’s excessive budget deficit procedure. Central and East European 
expenditures on EU membership are high and the project of economic restructuring and 
adjustment is far from complete.  
Distributional struggles are likely to test the limits of the New Europe for years to 
come. As noted at the outset, the future consequences of this general trend are difficult to 
predict. As with all reforms and innovations, the politics of European integration are 
likely to slow the process, leading to piecemeal, incremental change. On the one hand, as 
the EU grows in size, its characteristic policy features may  gradually ‘wither away’, with 
the EU looking more and more like a trading club and less like a political union.
41 This 
outcome  coincides  broadly  with  conventional  speculation  about  the  contradictions 
between widening and deepening. On the other hand, the alternative is that EU regional 
policy gradually be adapted to respond more strongly to the needs and interests of the 
more  advanced  EU  Member  states.  Predictably,  the  more  advanced  states  will either 
lobby hard for reform of the existing status quo, attempt to reduce the overall amount of 
EU expenditure, lobby to limit the future boundaries of the EU or ultimately threaten 
withdrawal from the union. In some ways, all four of these possible outcomes seem to be 
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Table I:  EU Budget for 2006 and Financial Perspective 2007-2013: February 2004 Proposal,  
December 2005 European Council Position and Final 2006 Totals (2004 prices) 
Structural and Cohesion Fund 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2007-2013 
SCF's (February 2004)  38,791,000  47,570,000  48,405,000  49,120,000  49,270,000  49,410,000  50,175,000  50,960,000  344,910,000 
Percent Change    22.6%  1.8%  1.5%  0.3%  0.3%  1.5%  1.6%  29.6% 
SCF's (December 2005)  38,791,000  42,840,000  43,288,000  43,820,000  43,801,000  43,995,000  44,634,000  45,241,000  307,619,000 
Percent Change    10.4%  1.0%  1.2%  0.0%  0.4%  1.5%  1.4%  15.9% 
SCF's (April 2006)  38,791,000  42,863,000  43,318,000  43,862,000  43,860,000  44,073,000  44,723,000  45,342,000  308,041,000 
Percent Change    10.5%  1.1%  1.3%  0.0%  0.5%  1.5%  1.4%  16.2% 
Competitiveness, Growth and Employment 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2007-2013 
C, G and E (Feb. 2004)  8,791,000  12,105,000  14,390,000  16,680,000  18,965,000  21,250,000  23,540,000  25,825,000  132,755,000 
Percent Change    37.7%  18.9%  15.9%  13.7%  12.0%  10.8%  9.7%  118.7% 
C, G and E (Dec. 2005)  8,791,000  8,250,000  8,860,000  9,510,000  10,200,000  10,950,000  11,750,000  12,600,000  72,120,000 
Percent Change    -6.2%  7.4%  7.3%  7.3%  7.4%  7.3%  7.2%  37.7% 
C, G and E (April 2006)  8,791,000  8,404,000  9,097,000  9,754,000  10,434,000  11,295,000  12,153,000  12,961,000  74,098,000 
Percent Change    -4.4%  8.2%  7.2%  7.0%  8.3%  7.6%  6.6%  40.5% 
Common Agricultural Policy 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2007-2013 
CAP (February 2004)  56,015,000  57,180,000  57,900,000  58,115,000  57,980,000  57,850,000  57,825,000  57,805,000  404,655,000 
Percent Change    2.1%  1.3%  0.4%  -0.2%  -0.2%  0.0%  0.0%  3.2% 
CAP (December 2005)  56,015,000  54,972,000  54,308,000  53,652,000  53,021,000  52,386,000  51,761,000  51,145,000  371,245,000 
Percent Change    -1.9%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -9.0% 
CAP (April 2006)  56,015,000  54,985,000  54,322,000  53,666,000  53,035,000  52,400,000  51,775,000  51,161,000  371,344,000 
Percent Change    -1.8%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -1.2%  -9.0% 
Sources:  own calculations based on appropriations data from Building Our Common Future (COM(2004) 101 final: p. 29), the UK 
Presidency Conclusions on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 (Doc 15915/05, CADREFIN 268, Dec. 19. 2005: Annex 1, p. 33), and 
the future budget of the European Union (http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_future/next_fin_framework_en.htm). Population data is from 
the Eurostat Online dataset. 
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Table II: Explaining Variation in Structural and Cohesion Fund Allocations 
2000-2006, 2007-2013 and Commission Proposal (2004) 
  Framework Perspective 
2000-2006  Commission Proposal 2004  Framework Perspective 
2007-2013 
Periods Combined  
(w/ Commission Prop.) 
 


































































































Region (E, W)  -2234.59 
(-2.43)  -  -  -0.34 
(-0.0)  -  -  394.87 
(0.43)  -  -  -567.34 
(-1.03)  -  - 














2  0.65  0.67  0.99  0.42  0.72  0.92  0.48  0.67  0.93  0.52  0.7  0.88 
N  25  15  10  27  15  12  27  15  12  52  45  34 
Sources: See Annex. (t-statistics in parentheses).  22 
Figures 1A and 1B: 




































Actual and Predicted Annual 2007-2013 SCF Allocations










































Actual and Predicted Annual 2007-2013 SCF Allocations
(Based on OMS Logic from 2000-2006 Framework Perspective, Euros per Person)
Predicted Values
Actual Values  23 
ANNEX: 
Dependent Variable: 
Total Allocation of Structural and Cohesion Funds. All data used are annual amounts 
derived by dividing the total allocation by the appropriate number of years. All data are in 
millions of Euros at 2004 prices. 
  2000-2006:  
o  European Commission, Working for the Regions:  
(http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/intro/working4_en.htm). The figures 
for the NMS’s include the lump-sum payments allocated with the 




  2004 Commission Proposal: 
o  Ostensibly from the European Commission.
42 
  2007-2013:  
o  Own calculation of total indicative allocations across categories (available 





  Population: Data is for the years 2001, 2003 and 2004 (from the Eurostat online 
database). 
  Per capita GDP: real per capita GDP at PPP’s, data for the years 2001, 2003 and 
2004 (from the Eurostat online database). 
  Public Support for EU membership: data is for the years 2002 (February), 2004 
(February)  and  2005  (Oct.-Nov.)  and  has  been  taken  from  the  Eurobarometer 
(2004, 2005) and the Candidate Country Eurobarometer (2002). 
  Unemployment: Data is for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 (from the Eurostat 
online database). 
  Region: NMS=1, OMS=0 
  Number of Member States: 15 for the period 2000-2006 and the Commission’s 
2004  proposal,  25  for  the  period  2007-2013.  The  Commission’s  proposal 
appeared in February, before the official date of membership in May, 2004. 
  Commission: if the proposal stems from the Commission, Commission=1, “0” if 
the proposal derives from a final agreement between the Council of Ministers and 
the EP. 
                                                 
42 Considerable secrecy surrounded these initial figures. The table of proposed allocations used in this analysis stems 
from a private secondary source and allegedly from the Commission itself. It is almost identical to a table published 
in Jouen (2005: 29). At the time of the proposal, the Commission disavowed the existence of any such table. 